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This paper evidences that the accepted pessimistic view, in terms of welfare, of regional 
trade agreements between developing countries can be challenged by scale economies in 
transport. This paper focuses on two main issues. First, how is the standard welfare analysis 
of regional trade agreement affected by the endogeneity of transport costs (i.e. by the joint 
determination  of  trade  quantities  and  transport  costs)?  Second,  what  are  the  long-run 
consequences of endogenous transport costs for welfare if worldwide free trade is achieved 
through  preferential  trade  agreements?  This  paper  extends  the  Spilimbergo  and  Stein 
(1998)’s model of interindustry trade (generated by relative factors endowment differences) 
intraindustry trade (generated by scale and product-diversity effects) and iceberg transport 
costs.  In  addition  of  assuming  a  “hub-and-spoke”  transport  network  structure,  we  also 
consider that transport costs depend on the distance between trade partners (three types of 
costs are defined: regional, continental and across ocean) and on their development level. 
Most  importantly,  we  allow  for  an  explicit  treatment  of  the  transport  sector.  The  main 
conclusion  is  that,  with  scale  economies  in  transport,  regional  liberalization  will  have 
persistent effect on trade flows through irreversible effect on regional transport costs that 
improve the final welfare, for a developing country, under regional free trade agreement as 
well as under worldwide free trade. 
 
JEL Classification: F12, F15, R40. 
Keywords: Regional Integration, Welfare, Transport Costs, Economies of Scale. 
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￿
INTEGRATION REGIONALE ET BIEN-ETRE DANS LES PAYS DU SUD : LE ROLE DES ECONOMIES 
D’ECHELLE DANS LES TRANSPORTS 
 
Ce papier met en évidence que les conclusions plutôt pessimistes, en termes de bien-être, des 
effets  des  accords  d’intégration  régionale  entre  pays  en  développement  peuvent  être 
nuancées par l' existence d' économies d' échelle dans les transports. Deux problématiques sont 
abordées: comment l’analyse traditionnelle de bien-être des accords d’intégration régionale 
est-elle affectée par l' endogénéité des coûts de transport (i.e. par la détermination conjointe 
des quantités commercées et des coûts de transport)? Quelles sont les conséquences sur le 
bien-être à plus long terme de coûts de transport endogènes dans le cas d’un libre-échange 
mondial  qui  serait  atteint  par  régionalisme  versus  négociations  multilatérales ?  Le  papier 
propose une extension du modèle de Spilimbergo et Stein (1998) qui introduit du commerce 
interindustriel (engendré par des différences de dotations factorielles), du commerce intra-
industriel (engendré par des économies d' échelle et des produits différenciés) et des coûts de 
transport de type “iceberg“. En plus de l' hypothèse d' un réseau de transport en étoile (de 
type  “hub  and  spoke“),  les  coûts  de  transport  sont  supposés  fonction  de  la  distance 
parcourue, et du niveau de développement des pays. Surtout, contrairement à toutes les 
simulations proposées jusque-là dans la littérature sur les accords régionaux, des économies 
d’échelle sont introduites dans le secteur des transports.  La principale conclusion est qu' avec 
des économies d' échelle dans les transports, l' intégration régionale a des effets persistants sur 
les flux de commerce (du fait de nouveaux investissements irréversibles dans le réseau de 
transport régional) qui permettent d' améliorer le bien-être d’un pays en développement en 
situation de libéralisation régionale comme de libre-échange mondial. 
 
Classification JEL: F12, F15, R40. 




Traditional tools to study Regional Trade Agreements (RTA)’s welfare are Viner’s (1950) 
trade creation and trade diversion. According to this pioneer work, welfare impact of a RTA 
formation is ambiguous, depending on the relative magnitude of trade creation and trade 
diversion.  Among  the  factors  that  can  influence  this  trade-off  and  then  the  welfare’s 
conclusion, transport costs have been recently emphasized. Wonnacott and Lutz (1989) first 
argued that RTAs are more likely to be welfare enhancing when formed among what they 
called “natural trading partners”, i.e. countries geographically closed. This idea has been 
then  developed  and  popularized  by  Krugman  (1991a,  1991b)  and  generalized  with 
simulation results by Frankel, Stein and Wei (1996). The former shows, in a monopolistically 
competitive framework, that continental free trade areas (i) decrease welfare unambiguously 
with  zero  intercontinental  transport  costs,  (ii)  increase  welfare  unambiguously  with 
prohibitive intercontinental transport costs. The latter investigates the continuum between 
zero and prohibitive intercontinental transport costs and concludes that all else constant, a 
preferential trade agreement is more likely to be welfare enhancing (i)  the more remote from 
the rest of the world continental trading partners are (i.e. the larger intercontinental transport 
costs are) thereby limiting potential trade diversion and (ii) the more natural (i.e. closer in 
distance) trading partners are thereby fostering potential trade creation.1 
￿
This argument of “natural trading partner” may potentially concern 77% of existing 
RTAs2. It is particularly relevant for RTAs between developing countries (or regional “South-
South” agreements), most of which are implemented between neighbor countries that are 
quite remote from major world markets.3 Actually, though developing countries benefit from 
some advances in transport costs, they still face considerably high transport costs. Shipping 
costs, for instance, are dramatically higher for developing countries according to the price 
quotes from international freight forwarders (see Hummels, 1999, Limao and Venables, 2001 
or  Busse,  2003).  Geographic  impediments  (such  as  landlockness),  poor  transport 
infrastructure (Limao and Venables, 2001), low competition intensity (problem for instance 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
1 See Baier and Bergstrand (2004) for a complete survey of simulation results.  
2  On  the  actual  208  PTAs  in  force  in  2004  (i.e.  notified  to  the  GATT/WTO),  160  are  implemented  between 
countries of a same region. Source: World Trade Organization secretariat and Author’s calculation. 
3 Examples include the Andean pact, el Mercado comùn del Sur (MERCOSUR), the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA), the Southern African Custom 
Union  (SACU),  The  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  of  West  Africa  (UEMOA),  the  Economic  and  Monetary 
Community  of  Central  Africa  (CEMAC),  Common  Market  for  Eastern  and  Southern  Africa  (COMESA),  the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC).  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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of “cargo reservation scheme”, Hummels 1999, Fink, Mattoo and Neagu, 2002), associated 
with  thin  traffic  densities  (which  can  lag  the  adoption  of  new  technologies  as 
containerization,  see  Hummels  1999),  contribute  to  explain  these  high  transport  costs  in 
developing  countries.  Moreover,  some  important  transport  problems  such  as  time  in 
shipping or custom clearance can severely increase the costs for developing countries, as 
developed by Hummels (2001) and Clark, Dollar and Micco (2002). Hence, in general, trade 
costs can be very large for developing countries (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). 
 
However, if taking into account transport costs is relevant for the analysis of South regional 
welfare, the above-mentioned models present two important caveats. First, the models in 
Krugman (1991a, 1991b) and Frankel, Stein and Wei (1996) assume a world with one factor, 
one  industry  and  identical  economies.  Then,  they  ignore  comparative  advantage  and,  as 
noted by Panagariya (1998, p.294), the fact that “distant partners can be efficient suppliers of 
certain products due to other cost advantages despite the fact that they must incur higher 
transport  costs.”4  This  is  borne  out  by  simulations  in  Spilimbergo  and  Stein  (1998)  that 
extend the model of Frankel, Stein and Wei (1996) introducing traditional Heckscher-Ohlin 
comparative advantage in the model.  
 
Second,  trade  costs  are  assumed  unaffected  by  equilibrium  quantities  of  trade.  Actually, 
transport technology is defined with the Samuelson (1954) assumption of “iceberg” transport 
costs, which supposes that only a constant fraction of the quantity shipped actually arrives 
(as if “only a fraction of the ice exported reaches its destination as un-melted ice”). Virtually, 
all simulation models so far analyzing the welfare of regional trade liberalization have relied 
on this representation of transport costs, thus ignoring the potential effect of scale economies 
in transport (e.g. Frankel, Stein and Wei, 1996, Nitsch, 1996, Frankel, 1997, Spilimbergo and 
Stein,  1998,  Baier  and  Bergstrand,  2004).  However,  recent  studies  provide  some  direct 
evidences of the importance of these scale economies in shipping costs. Hummels and Skiba 
(2004), based on a dataset covering the bilateral trade of six importers (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, and the United States) with all exporters worldwide in 1994, find 
that doubling trade quantities along a route reduces shipping costs by 12 percent for all 
countries on that route. The same order of magnitude is reported by Tomoya and Nishikimi 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
4 Krugman (1998, p.115) also notes, in a comment on Frankel, Stein and Wei (1996)’s paper, that the restriction of 
identical economic size may not be innocuous and “surely makes a major difference when we try to model the 
effects of integration”.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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(2002) : a 1% increase in the number of ships on a particular route between Japan and each of 
the Southeast Asian ports resulted in a 0.12% reduction in the freight rates. Fink, Mattoo and 
Neagu (2002), studying the liner transport price on all US imports carried by liners from 59 
countries  in  1998,  also  conclude  to  significant  economies  of  scale  with  regard  to  traffic 
originating from the same port. 
What  are  the  sources  of  these  scale  economies  in  shipping?  Hummels  and  Skiba  (2004) 
identify three main sources of gains in transport costs as trade quantities increase. First, a 
densely  traded  route  allows  for  effective  use  of  “hub-and-spoke”  shipping  economies.5 
Second, increased quantities encourage the introduction of specialized transport technologies 
along  a  route  (as  standardized  containerized  shipping  for  maritime  transport).  A  third 
source  of  scale  benefits  lies  in  pro-competitive  effect  on  pricing  (limiting  the  monopoly 
markups of for instance the “liner conferences”). In the model presented in this paper, we 
focus on the second source of scale economies in transport: the adoption of new transport 
technology when trade increases. The first source is assumed to be already implemented (we 
assume a pre-determined “hub-and-spoke” transport network)6 and the third one still to be 
explored in further research (we model here transport sector as a monopoly). Hence, in the 
model, according to the traded quantity, a monopoly shipper decides whether to pay sunk 
costs (such as investment in infrastructure) in order to adopt a lower marginal cost transport 
technology.  
 
This paper attempts to answer 2 questions: 
 
First, how is the standard welfare analysis of regional trade liberalization affected by the 
endogeneity  of  transport  costs  (i.e.  if  trade  quantities  and  transport  costs  are  jointly 
determined)?7  One  can  expect  that  regional  liberalization,  in  boosting  the  quantity  of 
bilateral trade between members, allows exploiting scale economies along regional routes 
(through  the  adoption  of  new  transport  technologies)  and  then  leads  to  a  reduction  in 
transport costs. This can represent a significant countervailing force in the traditional welfare 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
5 For instance “small container vessels move quantities into a hub where containers are aggregated into much 
larger and faster containership for longer hauls” (Hummels and Skiba, 2004). 
6 For an endogenous determination of the hubs according to the trade development, see Tomoya and Nishkimi 
(2002). 
￿￿Standard welfare analysis refers here to simulation models with iceberg transport costs (e.g. Frankel, Stein and 
Wei, 1996, Nitsch, 1996, Frankel, 1997, Spilimbergo and Stein, 1998, Baier and Bergstrand, 2004).￿CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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analysis of trade creation and trade diversion, notably from a developing country’s point of 
view. 
 
Second, what are the consequences of endogenous transport costs for welfare if worldwide 
free trade is achieved through preferential trade agreements?8 Suppose that the long-run 
objective is worldwide free trade. In order to achieve this aim, countries can choose between 
direct multilateral liberalization and development of a free trade agreement with regional 
partners first before liberalizing on a multilateral basis. With exogenous transport costs (i.e. 
transport costs independent to the level of trade), the welfare corresponding to worldwide 
free trade would be the same whatever the way chosen to achieve it (via regionalism or 
multilateral  liberalization).  Now,  suppose  endogenous  transport  technology.  Regionalism 
will have persistent effect on trade flows through permanent effect on regional transport 
costs that may change the final welfare under worldwide free trade.9 
 
To address previous issues, we start with the Spilimbergo and Stein (1998)’s framework, 
with  interindustry  trade  (generated  by  relative  factors  endowment  differences), 
intraindustry trade (generated by scale and product-diversity effects), and iceberg transport 
costs that we extend to introduce an explicit transport sector. We then analyze the welfare 
impact on the countries most likely to benefit from gains in transport: developing countries. 
Section  2  presents  the  model.  Section  3  compares the welfare evolution according to the 
degree  of  regional  preference  with  exogenous  /  endogenous  transport  costs.  Section  4 
presents welfare results when worldwide free trade is achieved through a regional path or 
not. Section 5 studies how sensitive the results are to some parameter values or assumptions 
changes.  We  also  present  some  extensions  such  as  results  for  North-South  agreements. 
Section 6 concludes. 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
8This question is inspired from Freund (2000)’s paper. Using a model with imperfect competition, she finds that a 
regional agreement before free trade leads to a greater expansion in world output than immediate free trade 
because  of  sunk  costs  to  expand  trade  and  investment  first  realized  within  the  regional  borders.  Actually, 
permanent effects from regional agreements arise if firms before free trade is achieved undertake irreversible 
investments that reduce production and distribution network costs.  
￿￿The idea in this paper is not to discuss if a developing country should prefer a Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) 
liberalization or a RIA, but rather to analyze whether, if trade is associated with sunk costs in transport, existing 
regional “South-South” agreements can generate persistent effects on member countries’ trade flows and then on 
their welfare when they move towards a multilateral liberalization after the regional liberalization.￿CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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￿
2. OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL 
 
In this section, we only present the general framework and main assumptions of the model, 
focusing on the proposed extensions concerning geography, transport network structure and 
transport sector. The exhaustive list of equations is reported in appendix.  
 
2.1. Basic Setup of Factor-Endowment and Imperfect-Substitutes Trade Model 
￿
Following￿ Spilimbergo  and  Stein  (1998),  we  assume  3  sectors:  agriculture,  intermediate 
inputs, and manufactures, and 2 factors of production: capital (K) and labor (L). We consider 
2 types of countries, which differ only in their capital endowment. In “poor” countries, each 
individual is endowed with 1 unit of capital, as well as 1 unit of labor. In “rich” countries, 
each individual owns 1 unit of labor and k units of capital (where k>1).10 The symmetry of 
the model between rich countries on one hand and between poor countries on the other hand 
allows  us  to  concentrate  on  a  representative  rich  country  (subscript  r)  and  on  a 
representative poor country (subscript p). 
 
Consumers in country i share a Cobb-Douglas utility function given by: 
( ) ( ) { }
￿




= = < £ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
With  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ the  consumption  of  manufactures  (agriculture)  in  country  i,￿ a the  share  of 
consumer’s income spent in manufactures and￿￿ a - in agriculture. 
 
Agriculture is a homogeneous good produced under constant returns to scale, and labor is 
the  only  factor  used  in  its  production.  Each  unit  of  labor  used  in  this  sector  (LAI)  is 
transformed into 1 unit of agriculture. Then, the production function is given by:  
{ } ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Therefore, given perfect competition:  
{ } ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = = ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
with ￿￿ ￿ the price of agriculture and ￿ ￿ the wage in country i.11￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
10 Since every individual within a country is equally endowed, we can set aside distributive considerations and 
work with a representative agent.  
11 The wage in poor countrys, wp, is used as numéraire in the model. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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Intermediate inputs are produced under monopolistic competition and use only capital as a 
factor of production. Increasing returns to scale are introduced by assuming a fixed cost, g , 
and a constant marginal cost, b : 








= = =      (4) 
￿ ￿ ￿  is the production of the jth variety in country i;;  ￿ ￿  is the number of intermediate input 
varieties produced in country i; and  ￿ ￿ ￿ is the total amount of capital used in the production 
of the jth variety in country.12  
Final  manufactured  good  is  produced  for  domestic  consumption  under  a  Dixit-Stiglitz 
technology with constant returns to scale, and each intermediate input enters symmetrically 
into its production: 
( ) { }
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
q q q = < < = = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ being the consumption of the jth variety of intermediate good produced in country i. This 
production  function  allows  for  preference  for  variety,  which  becomes  stronger  as  the 
parameter  q  becomes closer to 0 (For ￿=1, only differences in factor proportions explain 
trade; Intra-industry trade is eliminated and only inter-industry trade remains).13 
 
Hence,  trade  in  agriculture  goods,  produced  under  constant  returns  to  scale  with  labor 
responds  to  a  comparative  advantage  consideration  while  trade  in  intermediate  goods, 
produced under increasing returns with capital is driven by love for variety. Note that the 
number  of  intermediate  good  varieties  domestically  produced  depends  on  the  capital 
endowment of the economy. Consequently it is larger in the rich country than in poor ones 
by a factor of k (the capital to labor ratio).14 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
12 From the optimization solution of intermediate input producers, we obtain the producer price of the jth variety, 
the output per variety and the number of varieties produced in rich and poor countries. See appendix, equations 
(A.1)-(A.3).  
13 From the optimization solution of final good producer, we obtain the relative quantities of intermediate inputs 
demanded by each country and then the per capita production and the price of final manufactured goods. See 
appendix, equations (A.6)-(A.9). 
14 See appendix, equation (A.4). CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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2.2. Geography and Transport costs 
 
Consider a symmetric world divided into a number of continents, C, equidistant from one 
another and comprising the same number of countries, regions and blocs. We will work with 
a world of 4 continents (C=4) and 64 countries, 32 rich countries spread over 2 continents and 
32 poor countries over the two other continents. Each continent is decomposed in 4 regions. 
We assume that each bloc is implemented between the 4 neighbor countries of a same region. 
Due to the assumed repartition of countries in this stylized world, we then only consider 
blocs of “North-North” and “South-South” type.15 
 
We  assume  a  “hub-and-spoke”  transport  network  structure  as  usually  done  in  recent 
literature on economic geography (e.g. Frankel, Stein and Wei, 1996, Spilimbergo and Stein, 
1998, Fujita, Krugman, and Venables, 1999). 16 This is in accordance with: 
 (i) the emergence, observed in the recent decades, of transport hubs as a privileged 
network structure for many types of transport services, notably for freight and air;17 
(ii)  the  assumption  of  scale  economies  in  transport  sector,  as  this  is  precisely  the 
search of scale economies (in order to lower transport unit costs) that has generated the 
development of hub-and-spoke transport network (see Tomoya and Nishkimi, 2002).  
 
Each  country  represents  a  “spoke”  and  two  levels  of  “hub”  are  assumed:  regional  and 
continental. This implies 3 types of freight rates (in % of the quantity traded): 
fb: intra-regional (from spoke to spoke via the regional hub); 
fc: intra-continental (from a regional hub to another via the continental hub); 
fo: intercontinental (from a continental hub to another). 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
15 See section 5 for an analysis of “North-South” type blocs. 
16 See section 5 for the analysis of another transport network structure.  
17 In the case of maritime transport that largely dominates international trade, vessels size increased drastically in 
relation to the development of containerization. Container traffic is moreover essentially concentrated in major 
hub ports. The 20 largest container ports handled more than 52% of all the traffic in 2002. Examples include the 
European hub of Rotterdam, as well as Asian hubs in Singapore and Hong Kong ( see UNCTAD, Review of 
Maritime Transport, 2003). The extraordinary development of “hub-and-spoke” networks is also observed in 




Figure  1:  Illustration  of  the  assumed  “hub-and-spoke”  transport  network  in  case  of  2 
continents, 4 regions by continent, 4 countries by region. 
 
 
Trade between two countries in the same region involves two spokes and one regional hub, 
which implies transport costs equal to fb. Similarly, in the case of trade between countries in 
different regions of a same continent, transport costs are equal to (fb+fc) as two spokes, two 
regional hubs and one continental hub are implied. Finally, across ocean trade generates 
costs of (fb+fc+fo). Hence, implicitly, transport costs depend positively on distance. 
 
We assume fb=fc=0 for rich countries. This allows introducing a hierarchy in transport costs 
according to the development level of countries. Actually, for a given distance, North-North 
trade is less costly in terms of transport costs than North-South trades, which is in turn less 
costly than South-South trade.18 Finally, note that, for simplicity, we assume equal transport 
costs for intermediate inputs and agriculture products. 
 
Given all these assumptions on geography and transport costs, c.i.f prices of imports can be 
summarized as follow: 
 
(i) for the intermediate inputs faced by producers of manufactures: 
In a rich country  
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿







+  for North-
South trade and to 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + + for South-South trade. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
with pr(p) the producer price in a rich (poor) country. 
 
(ii) for the agriculture good (imported by rich from poor countries): 




￿ ￿ ￿ = + + + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 
Then, in the same way than tariffs on imports (assumed to be levied on the c.i.f price, see 
appendix),  transport  costs  increase  (i)  the  prices  of  foreign  intermediate  inputs  faced  by 
producers of manufactures and (ii) the difference in relative price of agriculture goods (and 
then the relative wage) between rich and poor countries. 
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 
We choose to model transport sector as a monopoly, for two main reasons. First, it allows to 
take into account the monopoly markup often observed in transport service prices on two 
types of routes: maritime (corresponding to transport between two continental hubs in our 
framework) and within the South continent.19 Maritime transport is characterized by the fact 
that  many  trade  routes  are  serviced  by  a  small  number  of  liner  companies  organized in 
formal  cartels  called  “liner  conferences”  (see  Hummels,  1999).  A  movement  towards 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
19 Note that the monopoly assumption does not concern transport within North continent as we have assumed 
fb=fc=0 for rich countries. Transport sector for these countries can then be seen as a competitive one, in accordance 
with features of transport sector in Europe or North America. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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concentration is moreover observed.20 Of course, according to the contestability theory, the 
small number of participants is no way indicative of their market power. However, even if 
the  question  of  whether  these  companies  successfully  exert  market  power  in  pricing 
shipping services has not a clear empirical answer, at least one study, by Fink, Mattoo and 
Neagu (2002), has found evidence that freight rates are sensitive to regulatory changes meant 
to constrain collusive behavior by liner conferences. Concerning developing countries, some 
studies indicate that factors such as national policies which severely restrict competition for 
transport  services  have  a  major  influence  on  the  level  of  freight  rate  in  developing 
countries.21 The second advantage of the monopoly shipper assumption is that investment in 
new  transport  technology  can  be  explicitly  introduced  in  the  model  as  a  function  of the 
shipper’s profit. 
As proposed by Hummels and Skiba (2004), we then assume that a monopoly shipper makes 
decisions  about  how  to  price  transport  services  and  which  transport  technology  to  use, 
maximizing the following profit, p :22 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ p = + + - - -         (8) 
 
With  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ the  total  traded  quantities  requiring  respectively  intra-regional,  intra-
continental and across ocean transport services and  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ the monopoly cost functions 
associated with the production of  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and  ￿ ￿  respectively.  
 
The costs along a given route h (regional, continental or intercontinental) are function of the 
transport technology parameters,  ￿ ￿ , the fixed (or sunk) costs and  ￿ k  the marginal costs per 
unit shipped: 
 
{ } ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ k = + =       (9) 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
20 Only a dozen firms in the World share 80% of the container traffic (against 40%, 10 years ago). The two leaders 
accounting for more than 23% of the traffic, reinforced their domination by taking over hub ports and signing 
agreements (as the Trans Atlantic Container Agreement) thereby forcing loaders to deal with them (see Rodrigue 
et al., 2004). 
21 For instance, much of Sub-Saharan Africa international transport is cartelized, reflecting the regulations of 
African governments intended to promote national shipping companies and airlines. Notably, as described by 
Amjadi and Yeats (1996) or Collier and Gunning (1999), many African governments (especially West African 
countries) have adopted “cargo reservation schemes” which allow privileged liner operators to set inflated freight 
rates considerably above those that would prevail in a competitive environment and to extend inferior quality 
services.   
22 Note that the monopoly is defined as supranational but it actually implicitly belongs to North countries as we 
assume  that  its  profit  is  symmetrically  distributed  to  consumers  of  rich  countries  (see  the  budget  constraint 
equation in the optimization problem of a representative North consumer in appendix). One can think of this in 
terms of payment of stock dividends to consumers of the rich countries. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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To produce transport services the monopoly uses labor from the poor country (see appendix, 
equation A.19).  
 
Finally,  we  assume  that  a  given  number  of  transport  technologies  are  available  for  the 
monopoly, each technology being characterized by the combination of parameters { } ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ k . 
The initial technology is assumed to require no fixed costs,  ￿ ￿ ￿ = , but has a high marginal 
cost per unit shipped. Then, as trade quantities along a route increase, the monopoly can 
choose to improve the transport technology used on that route, i.e. to purchase a reduction in 
marginal cost of  ￿ k D  with an incremental fixed cost  ￿ ￿ , according to the following relation: 
23   
 
{ } ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
m k m
D < = - =         (10) 
 
Note  that  changes  in  technology  are  discrete24,  irreversible25  and  occur  when  the  profit 
associated with the new technology overcomes the profit associated with the old one.  
 
To solve the model, we need to calibrate marginal costs per unit shipped  ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ k k k  and the 
technology function parameter, ￿ that determine the corresponding fixed costs  ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
The difficulty is that we don’t have any estimation of (i) the marginal costs per unit shipped 
on a representative route within a region, a continent or across ocean, (ii) the costs of new 
technologies  allowing  to  lower  marginal  costs.  Hence,  we  try  to  approximate  these 
parameters  according  to  (i)  some  estimations  on  the  transport  costs  level  and  (ii)  some 




Given the values of the ad-valorem tariff rate (t), the degree of intra-bloc preference (d), the 
difference in capital endowment (k), the Cobb-Douglas utility function parameter (a ), the 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
23 This relation assumes that a given reduction in marginal cost requires greater fixed costs when marginal costs 
are already small than when marginal costs are high. Note that a given investment generates a similar reduction 
in marginal costs (￿ constant) whatever the route h (regional, continental or intercontinental). 
24 As noted by Hummels and Skiba, 2004, “one can think of this choice either as a single yes/no decision on, for 
example, port infrastructure or [...] as a menu of ship sizes which shipper can select”. 
25 
￿ ￿  being considered as sunk costs, once a new transport technology adopted along a route, the monopoly 
cannot go back to previous technology if, for instance, trade quantities on that route decrease. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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Dixit-Stiglitz technology parameter for manufactures production (￿), the geography (number 
of  continents  C,  of  rich  and  poor  countries  Nr  and  Np,  of  countries  per  bloc  B)  and  the 
transport sector parameters ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ k k k m), together with the normalization wp=1, we can find 
the value of the utility of a representative individual in a poor country. All equations of the 
system are reported in appendix. 
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
Finally, to enable comparison with the existing literature, we define an alternative version of 
the  model  developed  in  the  previous  Section.  Following  Frankel,  Stein  and  Wei  (1996), 
Frankel  (1997),  Spilimbergo  and  Stein  (1998)  or  Baier  and  Bergstrand  (2004),  we  assume 
“iceberg”  transport  costs:  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ and  ￿ ￿   do  not  represent  the  freight  rate  fixed  by  the 
monopoly (in % of quantity traded) but the fraction of the output exported by a country that 
is “consumed” (or lost) due to regional, continental and across ocean transports respectively. 
This assumption is convenient as it avoids modeling a separate transport sector. Under this 
assumption, c.i.f prices of imports become: 
 
(i) for the intermediate inputs faced by producers of manufactures: 
In a rich country  
( )
( )
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿



































￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ - - - ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿  
In a poor country  
( )
( )( )
( )( )( )
( )
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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with pr(p) the producer price in a rich (poor) country. 
 
(ii)  for the agriculture good (imported by rich from poor countries): 











￿ ￿￿ ￿ - - - ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
 
An important thing to keep in mind is that once “iceberg” transport costs are introduced, 
there is a gap between consumption and quantity demanded (corresponding to the “lost” 
output in transport). In such a framework, in addition to the values of t, d, k, a , ￿, C, Nr ,Np 
and B, we need to fix the transport costs  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  (with still wp=1) to proceed to welfare 
simulations.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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3. WELFARE IMPLICATION OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 
In  this  section,  we  observe  the  evolution  of  country  welfare  when  there  is  a  symmetric 
formation of equal-sized blocs around the world. We first briefly consider the role of traditional 
exogenous “iceberg” transport costs in the theory of regionalism before turning to the more 
specific concern of this paper: the case of endogenous transport costs. We work with a world 
of  4  continents  (C=4),  2  continents  of  rich  countries  and  2  continents  of  poor  ones,  16 
countries  per  continent  ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = = ).  Each  continent  is  decomposed  in  4  regions.  We 
assume that blocs are implemented between the 4 neighbor countries of a region ( ￿ ￿ = ). All 
countries are assumed to levy the same tariff rate of 30% on imports (t=0.3), and we use the 
same  initial  values  than  Spilimbergo  and  Stein  (1998)  for  a =0.5  (half  of  the  consumer’s 
income  is  spent  on  agriculture  goods  and  the  other  half  on  manufactures)  and  ￿=0.75 
(corresponding to an elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods of 4). 
 
3.1. Traditional “Iceberg” Transport Costs  
 




We first assume no difference in factor endowment between countries (k=1). This implies 
that only intra-industry trade occurs between countries (agriculture is not traded as there is 
no comparative advantage). All countries being identical in terms of economic size, relative 
factor endowments, trade, tariffs and transport costs, the specification is very close to the 
monopolistically competitive framework in a perfect symmetric world proposed by Frankel, 
Stein and Wei (1996) and Frankel (1997). Figure 2 shows the effects of increasing the intra-
bloc preference margin (d) on the welfare of a representative country in case of blocs made of 
neighbor countries. For each set of parameter values, welfare is normalized to be 1 under the 




Figure 2: Welfare Implication of PTA with Traditional Iceberg Transport Costs   (t=0.3, 













When there is no transport cost ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = = = ), the welfare of a representative country 
reaches the optimum for a degree of intra-bloc preference of around 7% and becomes lower 
than the welfare of the initial non-discrimination situation (i.e. MFN with t=0.3) for d=12.6%. 
The  key  to  this  inverted-U  path  of  welfare  is  the  diminishing  marginal  utility  for  the 
consumption of each variety of intermediate goods.26 With the first reduction in intra-bloc 
tariffs, trade diversion has a small welfare effect because there is a shift between foreign 
varieties that were consumed in similar quantities (as in the initial situation, i.e. for d=0, no 
transport  cost  and  identical  tariffs  on  all  imports  are  assumed).  At  the  same  time,  trade 
creation effects are large because domestic varieties (with smaller marginal utility, as they 
are already consumed in large quantities) are replaced by the bloc members’ varieties. With 
the last reduction in intra-bloc tariffs (d=1) however, consumptions of member and domestic 
varieties equalize, while the consumption of other foreign varieties reduces: welfare effects of 
trade creation are then negligible while trade diversion effects are large.  
 
In  such  a  framework,  the  introduction  of  positive  «iceberg»  transport  costs  changes  the 
relative magnitude of trade creation and trade diversion and the associated welfare gains 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
26 The result that PTAs with less than 100% preferences can be superior to FTAs due to the relative magnitudes of 
trade  creation  and  trade  diversion  and  the  associated  welfare’s  gains  and  losses  (i.e.  the  inverted-U  path  of 
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and losses. Hence, they do not challenge the overall inverted-U path of welfare but modify 
the point where the welfare is maximized. Assume positive intercontinental transport costs, 
￿ ￿ ￿ > ,  with  still  zero  intra-continental  transport  costs,  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = = .  As  relative 
intercontinental transport costs ( ￿ ￿ ) increase, the volume of trade with remote countries (on 
other continents) decreases and that with nearby countries (on the same continent) increases. 
With less trade with remote countries, the relative tariff distortion introduced towards these 
countries  by  the  implementation  of  sub-continental  PTAs  has  less  impact  on  utility;  in 
Vinerian terms, there is less trade diversion. In the same way, with more trade with nearby 
countries,  the  elimination  of  tariff  distortion  towards  these  countries  has  greater  utility 
gain.27 Consequently, the larger the intercontinental transport costs, the more likely it is that 
PTAs between the 4 neighbor countries of a same region will have an immediate positive 
impact. As shown in figure 2, with  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = , the world reaches the welfare optimum for d= 
11% and enters the welfare-reducing zone for d=20.2%.28 This result is in the same range than 




We now assume that k=3 (each individual in the rich country is endowed with three units of 
capital). Transports costs are assumed to be the same whatever the level of development of 
the countries. We are then in a model identical to the one developed by Spilimbergo and 
Stein (1998)29.  
 
Figure 2 reports the evolution of the welfare of a representative “poor” country when blocs 
are implemented between the 4 neighbor countries of a same region (and of same level of 
development). The conclusion is quite similar to the one with a symmetric world. Trade 
based  on  comparative  advantage  only  occurs  between  rich  and  poor  countries.  As  a 
consequence, the implementation of blocs between countries with similar factor endowment 
does not modify the relative price of agricultural goods (as transport costs and tariff between 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
27 For a given distance between a country pair and the rest of the world, the closer the two countries (i.e. the lower 
their transport costs) are, the higher the trade volume is between them. Elimination of ad-valorem tariff between 
close by members alleviates the price distortion on a large amount of trade, improving utility of consumers more 
in regional PTAs.  
28  In  this  case,  for  d>20.2%,  we  face  what  Frankel,  Stein  and  Wei  (1996)  call  a  “supernatural  agreement”:  a 
welfare-reducing arrangement in case of natural trading partners. 
29 The only exception is the world geography as we assume 4 continents, each composed of 16 countries of 
identical development level, while they assume 2 continents, each composed of 15 rich and 15 poor countries. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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rich and poor countries remain unchanged). Hence, evolution in trade according to the intra-
bloc preference margin is essentially due to changes in intermediate input prices as in the 
case  of  symmetric  world.  Note  however  that  the  negative  effects  of  trade  diversion  are 
reinforced in this framework as a poor country trades also with rich countries following 
product variety consideration. In line with relative capital endowment differences, a rich 
country produces 3 times more intermediate good varieties than a poor country. Trade in 
these varieties is now diverted (as rich countries are non-members from a poor country point 




As a benchmark for the future simulations with endogenous transport costs, we keep the 
preceding  framework  (asymmetric  world)  but  with  non-zero  intra-continental  transport 
costs for poor countries. Hence, transport costs are now function of distance but also of the 
trade  partners  development  level,  as  described  in  section  2,  equations  (11)  and  (12).  We 
assume  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ =   and  for  poor  countries:  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = = .30  Results  are  reported  in  figure  2. 
Compared with Spilimbergo and Stein’s simulation results (presented above with  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ =  
and  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = = ), the negative return of regionalism for a representative poor country set in 
later (i.e. for a larger value of d). Actually, for small values of d, the positive effects of trade 
creation are reinforced as transport costs are now larger on all international trade flows - in 
particular on trade with all non members (as now positive transport costs also assumed on 
imports from continental non-members, i.e. countries in the same continent but not in the 
same region).31  
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
30 Transport costs are then the following: 
￿￿ between two poor countries in the same bloc: 1-(1-fb)=10%; 
￿￿ between two poor countries of different blocs but of the same continent: 1-(1-fb) (1-fc)=19%; 
￿￿ between two poor countries of different continents : 1-(1-fb) (1-fc) (1-fo)=27.1%; 
￿￿ between two rich countries of the same continents : 0%; 
￿￿ between two rich countries of different continents : 1-(1-fo)=10%; 
￿￿ between one rich and one poor country: 1-(1-fb/2) (1-fc/2) (1-fo)=18.8%. 
31 For a discussion of the results with non-zero intra-continental transport costs see Nitsch (1996), Frankel (1997, 
p.320-321), Baier and Bergstrand (2004, p.42-44). CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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3.2. Endogenous Transport Costs  
 
Traded quantities and transport costs are now jointly determined as proposed in Section 2: a 
monopoly  shipper  makes  decisions  about  how  to  price  transport  services  and  which 
technology to use. To improve the understanding of the implication of this new framework 
on the evolution of welfare, we proceed in two parts: we first assume that the monopoly 
shipper fixes transport service prices with a given transport technology and second we allow 
the monopoly to choose between several technologies. 
 
Single transport technology 
  
We choose as first (and for the moment single) technology:    ! ￿ k =  &  ￿ ￿ ￿ = ,  { } ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = . 
Under  MFN  (with  t=0.3),  with  such  marginal  costs,  the  prices  of  transport  services  that 
maximize the profit of the monopoly shipper are the following:  ￿￿ ￿ !￿ ￿ ￿ =   ￿￿￿ ￿!￿ ￿ ￿ =  
￿ ￿   ! ￿ ￿ = 32 which is in accordance with some estimations on the level of transport costs 
sustained by developing countries (see Limao and Venables, 2001, Hummels, 1999, 2001, 
Amjadi and Winters, 1997, Amjadi and Yeats 1996).  
 
In figure 3 we report the effects of increasing the intra-bloc preference margin (d) on the 
welfare of a poor country in the case of endogenous transport costs but single transport 
technology.  
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
32 Now transport costs are expressed in % of the quantity traded as defined in Section 2 equations (6)-(7). Note 
that the modelling of “ad-valorem” transport costs (i.e. expressed in % of the value traded) does not change the 
qualitative results reported in this paper. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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Figure 3: Welfare Implication of PTA with Endogenous Transport Costs 












The  poor  country  welfare  evolution  appears  to  be  less  favorable  to  PTAs  under  the 
assumption of monopoly shipper and given single transport technology than that of fixed 
iceberg transport costs (benchmark in figure 3). Tariff reduction, through the reduction of the 
elasticity  of  transport  demand,  causes  the  monopolist  to  charge  a  higher  markup  over 
marginal  costs.33  The  increase  in  intra-bloc  preference  margin  (d)  is  then  associated  with 
increased regional transport costs fb, which impede trade creation.34 However, the interesting 
and more realistic case is to assume that several technologies are available to the monopoly 
shipper. 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
33 This result is evidenced in Hummels and Skiba (2004)’s partial equilibrium model: lowering tariff leads to an 
outward shift in the demand for transport services thus to an increase in the price charged by the shipper. 
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Endogenous choice between transport technologies 
 
We  now  assume  that  the  choice  of  transport  technology  is  made  endogenously:  the 
monopoly shipper decides whether to pay a fixed (sunk) cost in order to adopt a lower 
marginal costs transport technology as described in section 2 equation (10). Recent studies 
provide some direct assessment of the importance of potential scale economies in shipping 
costs. As already noted in the introduction, Hummels and Skiba (2004) and Tomoya and 
Nishikimi (2002) find a remarkably similar estimation (though they study different regions of 
world):  increasing  trade  quantities  by  1%  along  a  route  reduces  freight  rates  by  0.12% 
percent for all countries on that route. Hence, we calibrate changes in transport technologies 
in order to respect this magnitude of scale economies in our simulation results: we assume 
that  each  investment  in  new  technology  induces  a  gain  in  marginal  cost  of  0.2  point  of 
percentage and that ￿=-15.35  
 
As shown in figure 3, once taking into account scale economies in transport and associated 
changes in technology, the poor country welfare never enters the welfare-reducing zone 
when a PTA is implemented. Actually, a “virtuous circle” is generated: the additive intra-
bloc  trade  (due  to  the  decrease  in  intra-regional  tariff)  increases  the  demand  for  intra-
regional  transport  services  which  leads  the  monopoly  to  adopt  lower  marginal  costs 
technologies on these routes and then to offer a lower intra-regional freight rate,  ￿ ￿ , which in 
turn boosts intra-bloc trade and positively affects trade creation.36  
 
The calibration of the model implies that each new increase of 0.1 point of percentage in the 
intra-bloc preference margin (d) allows a sufficient scale of trade (i.e. trade creation) to adopt 
a new technology along the regional route (and then to benefit from a decrease of 0.2 point of 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
35 Hence, the initial technology being    ! " ￿ ￿ k = = , the next technology corresponds to a marginal cost of 
4.8% and requires a fixed cost around 
￿ ￿ ￿ #￿ ￿￿ ￿!￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿$
￿ ￿ ￿
- - = - = which represents around 10% of the monopoly 
profit in the initial situation (i.e. under MFN and with    ! " ￿ ￿ k = = ); The technology corresponding to a 
marginal cost of 4.6% requires a fixed cost around 
￿ ￿ ￿ #￿ ￿￿ ￿!￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
- - = - = which represents about 21% of the 
monopoly profit in the initial situation, etc. 
36  Note  that  the  intra-continental  and  intercontinental  transport  services  demands, 
￿ ￿ and 
￿ ￿ respectively, 
decrease due to trade diversion. Hence, no new technology is adopted on routes between two regional hubs and 
between two continental hubs respectively. However, as all trade flows have to pass through a regional hub, the 
improvement on regional routes (and then the decrease in 
￿ ￿ ) generates positive externalities for all routes that 
lighten the negative effect of trade diversion. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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percentage in marginal costs on that route), generating a discrete change in freight price  ￿ ￿  
charged and then a jump to the welfare curve associated to the new technology (dotted lines 
in figure 3, normalized to be 1 under MFN regime and the first technology).37 Hence, the 
conclusion (that poor country welfare never enters in the welfare-reducing zone when a PTA 
is  implemented)  only  holds  because  of  the  assumed  transport  technology  parameters.  If 
greater sunk costs are needed to obtain marginal cost gains, then the adoption of the new 
technologies (and the “jump” to the associated higher welfare curves) occurs later. Then, 
with  more  costly  technologies,  poor  countries  may  sometimes  and  temporally  enter  in  the 
welfare-reducing  zone  (until  the  adoption  of  the  next  technology).  However,  the  curve 
reported in figure 3 is in accordance with the econometric assessments of economy of scale in 
transport  previously  detailed:  between  MFN  (d=0)  and  FTA  (d=1),  total  import  demand 
requiring intra-regional transport services has increased by 133% while the price of intra-
regional transport services (fb) has decreased by around 16%. This figure corresponds to the 
estimation of “doubling trade quantities along a route reduces shipping costs by a 12 percent 
on that route” evidenced by Hummels and Skiba (2004). 
 
4. WELFARE IMPLICATION OF MULTILATERAL LIBERALIZATION 
 
What are the long-run consequences of endogenous transport costs for welfare if worldwide 
free  trade  is  achieved  through  preferential  trade  agreements  as  opposed  to  immediate 
multilateral negotiation? These two scenarios are reported in figure 4. We report the welfare 
of a poor country in case of multilateral liberalization from a situation of MFN clause (with 
t=0.3) and from a situation of FTA. Note that with fixed “iceberg” transport costs, the model 
would  predict  the  same  welfare  as  under  worldwide  free  trade  (i.e.  when  degree  of 
multilateral liberalization is equal to 1 in figure 4) whatever the way is achieved. 
Figure 4: Welfare Implication of Multilateral Liberalization 






37 The technology corresponding to the FTA (i.e. d=1) is characterized by marginal costs  $ !
￿ k = (and then fixed 
costs equal to  ￿￿ $  
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With scale economies in transport, poor country welfare in worldwide free trade is superior 
when obtained from a FTA situation than from a MFN situation. Several factors explained 
this result. First, at the starting point, welfare with FTAs is already superior to the one with 
MFN  thanks  to  the  adoption  of  improved  transport  technologies  on  regional  routes  as 
evidenced in previous section (figure 3).  
 
Second,  the  gap  between  the  two  curves  increases  during  the  multilateral  liberalization 
process. Now, trade increases between all countries and then along all the routes (regional, 
continental  and  across  ocean).  According  to  the  repartition  of  this  increase  on  different 
routes, the monopoly will choose the combination of technologies that maximizes its profit.38 
From the MFN situation, the multilateral liberalization (i.e. the un-discriminatory decrease in 
the  ad-valorem  tariff  t)  generates  an  increase  in  trade  with  the  three  types  of  partners: 
countries in the same region, countries outside the region but within the same continent and 
countries  from  other  continents.  From  the  FTA  situation,  as  regional  trade  is  already 
developed, the additive trade generated by the decrease of multilateral tariff is concentrated 
on  the  non-member  countries.  This  increase  in  trade  with  non  member  is  all  the  more 
important because previous trade diversion was large. This relates to the “catch-up” effect 
when distortions decrease. Hence, total demand for transport services along continental and 
across ocean route (fc and fo respectively) increases more during the multilateral liberalization 
from the FTA situation than from MFN. In addition, from a FTA situation, new technology 
along regional routes is already adopted (thanks to the trade creation generated during the 
implementation of the FTA) and cannot be reversed by a decrease in trade along regional 
route as we have assumed sunk costs. Then only two trade routes (continental and across 
ocean)  still  need  to  be  developed  while,  from  MFN,  the  monopoly  starts  with  the  first 
technology on the three routes. All these conditions explain that the monopoly is able to 
adopt  efficient  transport  technologies  more  quickly  on  all  routes  during  the  multilateral 
liberalization from a FTA than from a MFN situation. The new technologies reinforcing the 
trade increase, the gap between the two curves augments.39 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
38 As developed in section 2, the technology is specific to each kind of routes and then each route can use a 
different level of transport technology.  
39 Note that in figure 4, the poor country welfare reached under worldwide free trade from a MFN situation is 
clearly superior to the one obtained under FTA (this result is challenged in section 5 when the assumption on 
transport network is modified). Once again, the aim of this section is not to compare multilateral liberalization to 
regional liberalization but to compare two situations of worldwide free trade achieved with or without a regional 
path. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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Hence, with scale economies in transport costs, regionalism will have a persistent effect on 
trade flows through a permanent effect on regional transport costs that improves the final 
welfare under worldwide free trade. 
￿
5. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND EXTENSIONS 
 
We attempted in sections 3 and 4 to shed some light on the evolution of a poor country 
welfare that would result from symmetric regional trade blocs, taking into account scale 
economies  in  transport  costs.  Throughout  the  simulations  we  worked  with  the  same 
benchmark set of parameter values (t=0.3, k=3, a =0.5 or ￿=0.75) and with some important 
assumptions  on  the  structure  of  the  transport  network  (“hub-and-spoke”  type).  We  now 
study  how  sensitive  the  results  are  to  some  changes  in  the  parameter  values  or  in 
assumptions. 
 
5.1. Relative importance of product variety and comparative advantage as sources of gains 
from trade. 
 
Two parameters are concerned: a  (Cobb-Douglas utility function parameter that represents 
the  share  of  consumer’s  income  spent  in  manufactures)  and  q   (Dixit-Stiglitz  production 
function  parameter  that  represents  preference  for  variety  in  intermediate  inputs).  An 
increase in q , for a given a , results in higher elasticity of substitution between varieties of 
intermediate  input  and  thus  in  greater  changes  in  the  consumption  responses  to  given 
changes in relative prices. Hence, the welfare effects of trading blocs become more important 
for higher values of q  (see details in Spilimbergo and Stein, 1998). The evolution evidenced 
in figures 3 and 4 is reinforced as traded quantities are more sensitive to tariff changes and 
new transport technologies are adopted more quickly.40 An increase (decrease) in a , for a 
given q , results in higher relative importance of product variety (comparative advantage) as 
a source of gains from trade. We report simulations in figures 5a and 5b.  
 
Qualitative results remain. At the first stage (PTAs welfare vs. MFN), with  ￿￿ % a = , love for 
variety is increased. This boosts the trade creation within symmetric trade blocs leading to a 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
40 However, for very high values of q  (q >0.95 in our model), as q  approaches 1, the taste for variety disappears 
and so does the intra-industry trade, thus reducing the effects of symmetric trading blocs  (see figures 2 through 5 
in Spilimbergo and Stein, 1998). CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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regional welfare increase. In the same way, trade diversion is reinforced, in line with the 
shape of the regional curve in figures 5a. With  ￿￿ ￿ a = , the share of trade flows based on 
comparative advantages increases thereby limiting the effect of regional preferential tariff on 
trade between countries with similar factor endowments. However, Note that in the two 
cases  ( ￿￿ % a =   and  ￿￿ ￿ a = ),  we  observe  a  similar  evolution  in  the  demand  of  regional 
transport  services,  ￿ ￿ ,  and  then  similar  change  in  the  adoption  of  new  transport 
technologies.  41 This explains that at the end, for d=1, a similar level of regional welfare is 
reached (relative to MFN welfare). 
Figures 5a: higher relative importance of comparative advantage as a source of gains 
(t=0.3, k=3, ￿=0.75, C=4, Nr=Np=16, B=4). 
 











Figures 5b: higher relative importance of product variety as a source of gains (t=0.3, k=3, ￿=0.75, 
C=4, Nr=Np=16, B=4). 
 










41 Remember that, for each country, all trade flows pass through the regional hub. Hence, a FTA that generates a 
strong  regional  trade  creation  associated  with  a  strong  trade  diversion  may  have  the  same  impact  on  the 
evolution qb than a FTA with little trade impact (weak trade creation as diversion). The results should be different 
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As far as the second stage (multilateral liberalization from FTA or from MFN) is concerned, 
the increasing gap between the two curves remains. In the model, multilateral liberalization 
mainly impacts on North-South trade, which is essentially based on comparative advantage. 
Hence, it is not surprising that increasing the relative importance of comparative advantage 
as source of gains from trade implies a stronger welfare increase during the multilateral 
liberalization stage. In any case (i.e. whatever the value of  a ), the gap between the two 
curves  (multilateral  liberalization  from  regionalism  and  from  MFN)  increases  during  the 
multilateral liberalization stage, all the more since a  (i.e. love for variety) is important. 
Finally, note that changes in the relative difference in North / South capital endowment, k, 
provide  similar  results  than  changes  ina .  Assuming  a  decrease  in  k  is  equivalent  to 
increasing the relative importance of product variety as a source of gains from trade (until 
k=1 where only intra-industry trade remains). Alternatively, an increase in k corresponds to a 
boost in trade based on comparative advantage consideration. 
 
5.2. Structure of the Transport Network 
 
We have assumed a “hub-and-spoke” transport network structure: for each country, all trade 
flows pass through the regional hub and all trade flows with countries outside the bloc pass 
through the continental hub. On the other extreme, we can assume that, for each country, 
there  exist  three  independent  routes  corresponding  to  the  three  kinds  of  trade  partners: 
regional,  continental  outside  the  region  and  across  ocean.  In  such  a  transport  structure, 
transport costs for trade between two countries in the same region are equal to fb, transport 
costs for trade between countries in different regions of a same continent are equal to fc and 
across ocean trade costs are equal to fo. Figures 6 compare results for a “hub-and-spoke” 
transport network with those for an “independent routes” one. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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Figures 6: “hub-and-spoke” vs. “independent routes” transport network. 
      (t=0.3, k=3, a a a a =0.5, ￿=0.75, C=4, Nr=Np=16, B=4) 
 











There  is  no  significant  difference  between  the  two  transport  structures  during  the 
implementation of a FTA. Actually, even if demand for regional transport services increases 
more  quickly  with  the  assumption  of  “independent  routes”  (with  the  “hub-and-spoke” 
network,  the  increase  in  demand  for  regional  routes  was  limited  by  the trade diversion, 
which is no more the case with an independent regional route), the total volume of regional 
imports  is  smaller  (as  regional  route  are  now  only  use  by  for  regional  trade).  Then, 
monopoly shipper profits on these routes is smaller than with a “hub-and-spoke” network 
and new transport technology appears relatively more costly.  
 
Concerning the multilateral liberalization stage, conclusions are quite different depending on 
the transport network assumption: with an “independent routes” network, FTA’s welfare is 
superior to that for worldwide free trade reached through MFN clause. This is due to the fact 
that with a MFN liberalization, trade is spread too thinly among all partners so that the 
improved shipping technology is never adopted.42 We join the analytical conclusion of Skiba 
(2004) that finds that “if regional economies of scale in transport are strong enough, then it is 
possible  to  improve  world  welfare  relative  to  free  trade  by  forming  preferential  trading 
blocs”. In his model, iceberg transport costs depend on the total volume of bilateral trade 
(assuming  then  that  there  are  as  many  independent  routes  as  trade  partners  and  no 
hubbing).  
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
42 In the simulation reported in figure 6, only change in across ocean trade is sufficient to adopt new technologies 
that allow a decrease of one point of percentage in across ocean marginal transport costs (instead of a gain of two 
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Finally, note that a limit of our analysis is that we have always assumed a “pre-determined” 
network while we can also imagine an endogenous determination of these hubs according to 
the trade development. This is done by Tomoya and Nishkimi (2002) who develop a general 
equilibrium model of a spatial economy in which the structure of the transport network is 
determined by the interaction between industrial location behavior and increasing returns in 
transport.  
 
5.3. North/South Trade Blocs  
 
We have assumed that all the blocs were implemented between neighbor countries implying 
symmetric blocs (i.e. between countries with similar factor endowment). What happens if we 
assume the formation of North/South blocs? We allow for the formation of a single bloc 
between  two  poor  and  two  rich  countries.43    Figures  7  report  welfare  evolution  for  a 
representative poor country in case of North/South blocs.  
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
43 This forces us to consider two new types of countries in the model: countries in the same region but outside the 
bloc  and countries on other continent but within the bloc.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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Figures 7: Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Trade Blocs. 
      (t=0.3, k=3, a a a a =0.5, ￿=0.75, C=4, Nr=Np=16, B=4) 
 













The  evolution  of  welfare  during  the  North/South  bloc  implementation  is  close  to  the 
evolution of welfare under multilateral liberalization as now the two sources of gains from 
trade,  product  variety  and  comparative  advantage  can  be  exploited  within  the  bloc. 
However, due to trade diversion, North/South FTA’s welfare is inferior to the worldwide 
free trade notably because trade volume is smaller and transport costs are higher. The trade 
diversion limits the increase in demand for regional, continental and across ocean transport 
services compared to worldwide free trade. As such it limits the advances in technology 
adoption compared to those under worldwide free trade. In terms of transport technology, 
note that if symmetric blocs, in concentrating trade on regional routes, have allowed a gain 
of 2% in regional marginal transport costs, North/South blocs, in promoting trade on the 3 
routes (regional, continental, across ocean), have allowed gains on these 3 routes but by a 
smaller amount as trade is spread out. The gain amounts to 1% on each marginal transport 
costs, which is also smaller than under worldwide free trade. 
 
As  far  as  multilateral  liberalization  is  concerned,  the  welfare  increase  following  a 
North/South FTA is smaller than the one following a symmetric FTA or a MFN situation as 
across ocean trade has already being developed during the first stage of regionalism. At the 
end, poor country welfare under worldwide free trade when reached through North/South 
regionalism is (i) higher than through MFN liberalization (thanks to higher volume of trade 
and then better technology on all 3 routes) but (ii) smaller than through symmetric blocs due 
to less advanced regional transport technology (which is the base of all kinds of transport 
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In broad terms, the simulation results suggest that the accepted pessimistic view of regional 
trade  agreements  between  developing  countries  may  be  exaggerated.  RTAs  between 
Southern  partners  look  more  favorable  once  one  takes  into  account  scale  economies  in 
transport  (and  the  associated  changes  in  transport  technology  from  a  profit-maximizing 
monopoly shipper). The Southern country’s welfare never enters in a welfare-reducing zone 
when  an  increasingly  discriminatory  PTA  is  implemented.  This  is  thanks  to  a  “virtuous 
circle”: the additive intra-bloc trade (due to the decrease in intra-regional tariffs) reduces the 
intra-regional  transport  costs.  This  reduction  in  turn  boosts  the  intra-bloc  trade  and  the 
positive effect of trade creation. The model also shows that the persistent effects of a PTA on 
trade  flows  (through  irreversible  effects  in  terms  of  investments  in  regional  transport 
technologies) may improve the final welfare, for a developing country, under worldwide 
free trade. 
 
While these results are at best suggestive,44 they could justify the recent priority of “new” 
agreements  like  the  New  Partnership  for  Africa’s  Development  (NEPAD)  that  put  an 
emphasis  on  investments  in  regional  infrastructure  and  transport  networks,  as  the 
development  of  “transport  and  trade  facilitation”  agreements  that  have  been  recently 
reached  as  part  of  RTAs  in  most  of  the  “South-South”  regional  agreements  such  as 
MERCOSUR, Andean pact, SADC, COMESA, UEMOA, SAFTA or the ASEAN.  
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
44 This is due to the fact that several key parameters cannot be directly estimated econometrically such as the 
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APPENDIX.  EQUATIONS OF THE MODEL. 
 
As describe in section 2, we assume:  
 
(i) 3 sectors: 
Agriculture, produced with labor under constant returns to scale; 
Intermediate good, produced with capital under increasing returns to scale; 
Manufactures, produced with intermediate good under constant returns to scale; 
 
(ii) 2 types of countries, with a capital to labor ratio of 1 in the poor country and of k>1 in 
the rich country;45 
 
(iii) a World of 4 continents ( ￿ ￿ = ), 2 continents of rich countries and 2 continents of 
poor ones, 16 countries per continent ( ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = = ); Each continent comprises 4 regions; 
We assume that blocs are implemented between the 4 neighbor countries of a same region 
( ￿ ￿ = ); 
 
(iv) a “hub-and-spoke” transport network with 3 types of freight rates: 
fb: intra-regional (from spoke to spoke via the regional hub); 
fc: intra-continental (from a regional hub to another via the continental hub); 
fo: intercontinental (from a continental hub to another); 
 
Optimization Problem of Intermediate Input Producers 
 
{ } ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ p = - = =  
 
With  ￿ ￿ p  the producer profit of the jth variety in country i,  ￿ ￿ ￿ (pji) the production (producer 
price)  of  the  jth  variety  in  country  i  ,  ￿ ￿ the  number  of  intermediate  input  varieties 
produced in country i and ri   the price of capital in country i. Intermediate inputs are 
produced under monopolistic competition with capital. The total amount of capital used 
in the production of the jth variety in country i,  ￿ ￿ ￿ , is:  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ g b = +  with g  the fixed cost 
and b the constant marginal cost. 
 
From the first order condition for profit maximization (derivation available upon request) 
we obtain the profit-maximizing price :46 
 
{ } ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
b
q
= = = =       (A.1) 
 
which, combined with the free entry condition, gives the output per variety: 
 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿For simplicity we assume that labor, L, also represents the population size and that  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = = . The total 
capital is therefore 
￿ ￿ ￿ !￿ ! = =  in a rich economy and   ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = = in a poor one.￿
46 ￿ being the parameter of substitution in the final manufactured good production function, see later.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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{ } ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
qg
b q
= = = =
-
    (A.2) 
 
Introducing the expression of x into the capital market equilibrium condition of a country 
i,  i.e. ( ) ( )
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ b g b g
= =
= = + = + ￿ ￿ ,  gives  the  number  of  varieties  produced  in 
country i: 
 











=         (A.3) 
 
Equation (A.3) implies that the number of varieties produced in the rich country will be 











= =             (A.4) 
 
The  relative  price  of  capital  in  rich  and  poor  countries  will  be  denoted  asr .  Hence, 
according to equation (A.1),  r  is also equal to the price of the home varieties in a rich 





r = =             (A.5) 
 
Optimization Problem of Final Good Producer 
 
The prices of foreign intermediate inputs faced by producers of manufactures, in terms of 
the ones produced at home, are given by: 
 




( ) ( )
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
  (A.6r) 
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ #
￿ ￿ ￿
r
= + + -
= + + +
= + + + +







￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 (A.6p) 
 
with origin r: rich country/ p: poor country/ b: bloc members/ c: other countries (non 
members) within the continent/ o: overseas countries;  
t represents the MFN ad valorem tariff (uniform across countries); CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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d represents the degree of intra-bloc liberalization [d=1 (0) free trade area (MFN)]. 
 
The producer of the final good faces the following problem: 
 






￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
 ￿￿ ￿ ￿




q q = < £
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
varieties from rich countries ntries overseas
 
with  ￿ ￿  the consumption of an intermediate good variety produced in country i. 
 
Then,  the  producer  of  manufactures  will  demand  the  following  relative  quantities  of 
intermediate inputs (from the first order conditions, derivation available upon request): 















￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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￿ ￿
            (A.7p) 
 
In equilibrium, the per capita production of the manufactured good will be: 
 
In a rich country:   ( ) ( )
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ q q y =                (A.8r) 
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 
In a poor country:  ( ) ( )
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ q q y =               (A.8p) CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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( ) ( )
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿









The  zero  profit  condition  in  the  production  of  manufactures  yields  the  price  of  final 
manufactured goods in terms of the intermediate home variety: 
In a rich country:  ( )
￿




=         (A.9r) 
In a poor country:  ( )
￿




=          (A.9p) 
 
Optimization Problem of Consumer 
 
In a rich country  
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 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿











with  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ the  consumption  of  manufactures  (agriculture)  in  country  i,  a the  share  of 
consumer’s income spent in manufactures and ￿ a - in agriculture, p  the total transport 
monopoly profit (see later) and T the per capita tariff receipts that are handed back to 
consumers as a lump-sum transfer: 
 




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿
& # " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
= - - + - + - +
+ + + + + + +
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
(A.10r) 
In a poor country:  
( ) ( )
( )
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
& # " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
= - - + + - + +
+ - + + + + + + +
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
(A.10p) 
 
The first order conditions of the consumer optimization problem yield: CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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Equilibrium in the Market for an Intermediate Input Variety  
 
Produced in a rich country: 
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from rich countries overseas from poor countries overseas
 (A.12r) 
Produced in a poor country: 
( ) ￿ ( )
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Equilibrium Condition in Agriculture  
 
The production function in agriculture is given by:  { } ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = = .  
Therefore, given perfect competition:  { } ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = =     (A.13) CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
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with  ￿￿ ￿ the price of agriculture and ￿ ￿ the wage in country i. 
Since  agriculture is a homogeneous good, the law of one price requires the following 
relative wage between the rich and the poor country:  
￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
#
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿




      (A.14) 
The equilibrium in the agriculture sector is given by: 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ + = + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿




We assume then that a monopoly shipper makes decisions about how to price transport 
services and which technology to use, maximizing the following profit, p : 
 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ p k k k = - + - + - - - -     (A.16) 
 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ : total traded quantity requiring respectively intra-regional, intra-continental and 
across ocean transport services  
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ :  fixed  costs  required  by  the  technology  of  transport  services  between  two 
spokes, two regional hubs and two continental hubs respectively; 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ k k k : marginal cost per unit shipped between two spokes, two regional hubs and two 
continental hubs respectively. 
 
Demand for transport services (qb; qc; qo) can be written: 
qb: equal to the sum of all demands of foreign goods, i.e. the sum of all consumptions of 
foreign goods:  
￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
= - + - + +
+ + -
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(A.17) 
qc: equal to the sum of all demands for foreign goods from outside the bloc, i.e.: 
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         (A.18) 
qo: equal to the sum of imports from other continent countries:  
￿ ￿
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￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
           (A.19) 
 
Concerning the monopoly cost function, we assume that the total cost of the transport 




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
&￿ ￿ ￿ k
=
= + ￿         (A.20) CERDI, Etudes et Documents, 2005.13￿
￿ 40
To produce transport services the monopoly uses poor country’s labor.  












          (A.21) 
We also assume that the agriculture sector acts as a “residual employer”:  ￿￿ !￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = - .47 
Hence,  an  increasing  demand  of  transport  services  may  slow  down  the  agriculture 
production  (through  the  decrease  in  the  agriculture  labor  force)  which  in  turn  may 
increase the agriculture price pap and then the wage paid in poor countries wp.48 
 
All these equations together with the normalization wp=1 allow us to determine the prices 
of production factors ( ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .49 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
47  As  the  monopoly  only  used  poor  country’  labor,  we  always  have,  in  rich  countries:  ￿
!￿ ￿ =   and 
then ￿
￿￿ !￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = - = . 
48 As wp is used as numéraire in the model, an increase in wp is actually reflected by a decrease in prices of 
other goods.  
49 As, in equations for equilibrium in the intermediate input (equations A.12), the consumption of the home 
variety cr and cp can be replaced by an expression in terms of the respective prices of factors in rich and poor 
countries respectively (obtained from equations (A.8), (A.9), (A.10), (A.11), (A.14); derivation available upon 
request): 
In rich country: 
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￿